Not really the right question. FIPS doesn’t stop ‘hackers’ like a forcefield. It’s a validated baseline for crypto modules (RNGs, key handling, approved modes, self-tests). The security win is fewer crypto footguns and more assurance, not a dramatic war story.
It's exactly the right question, "what (demonstrable) value are you getting from this?". Having been through several FIPS certifications I can say that it added nothing to the security of the product, in fact if anything it reduced the security because of all the silly-walk stuff that had to be added. In particular the algorithm certs are essentially worthless because if you get (say) AES wrong you'll find that out the very first time you use it, with or without a NIST algorithm cert, and beyond that for level 1 which is what 99% of products go for it's mostly a paperwork-production exercise and the aforementioned silly-walk code changes.
About 30+ years ago it was somewhat useful for keeping out the homebrew snake-oil crypto that was common at the time, but since you can find (again as an example) AES code in the implementation language of your choice and license of your choice within seconds that's not been an issue for some time.
Fair. Level 1 can be heavy on paperwork, and compliance code can add complexity. But ‘algorithm certs are worthless’ is overstated: lots of crypto failures are silent misuse (modes/nonces/RNG/key handling), not ‘AES won’t decrypt.’ FIPS isn’t a magic shield, it’s a baseline control. Whether it’s net-positive depends on how much it slows upgrades and how disciplined the team already is.
