A problem with on-shore wind is that it is already getting hard to find more space for it in some European countries. You also can't put windmills in densely populated areas where most power is needed so you have to take energy transmission cost into account as well.
If it can be demonstrated that these reactors are safe, you could put them almost anywhere.
While the operational safety sounds excellent, I am worried about what a generalization of this kind of reactor would entail. Your typical reactor is under heavy surveillance and 200 (67?) times more powerful : we are very unlikely to "lose track" of the fuel.
Let's say this becomes moderately popular and we soon have a million of them across the world (enough for about 10% of our today's energy needs)... who is going to keep track of all of them ?!
The High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium required here is enriched between 5% and 20% compared to a conventional reactor using between 3% and 5% fuel. Because enriching from the natural 0.7% to 20% is 90% of the effort, 20% is considered to be the line separating civilian and military uses. And we're much closer to that limit with these reactors. I am baffled that this is not being even mentioned in the article, nor the pdf ? (I guess they are not particularly willing to disclose just how many of those would need to be gathered for the minimum 25 kg of 90% enriched Uranium for a bomb ?)
And as safe as these might be under normal operation, how many decades for a forgotten abandoned one, exposed to the weather, to leak ? How much and what kind of radiation release can we expect ? (Carried by water to the closest steam I assume?)
You need over 90% enriched for practical nuclear weapon use. It is not "most of the effort" to get to 20%: in fact, if you're stealing it then it's none of the effort: you don't have a centrifuge operation, so whether it's natural or 20% or 70% it is all equally useless.
The difficulty of enrichment is the plant and logistics of doing it, none of which you can steal.
I should have been more clear that I am assuming an hostile nation-state with some minimal capabilities : the biggest difficulty is probably to be able to deliver the bomb to a target once you have one, which gets even worse if you want to use it as an open threat for deterrence rather than a (frankly suicidal) surprise attack : you pretty much need an ICBM (see all the North Korean failures before they (supposedly) stole SSR-Ukrainian tech).
Difficulty of enrichment seems to be heavily proportional to time : the whole "game" around Iran's enrichment seems to be about not letting them get it high enough that they can go from weapons-useless uranium to a ready bomb in a short enough amount of time for the other countries not being able to react.
(There's also a possibility of a much smaller actor to make a dirty bomb from that mildly enriched uranium, but I have even less ideas about how likely that is.)
Periods where wind operates below 5% capacity in Poland are really common. I've seen it once below 1%. When I write this it's 7,5% - below 10% for 14 hours already.
If it can be demonstrated that these reactors are safe, you could put them almost anywhere.