I think Obnam's idea of deduplication is great and very interesting but I am reluctant to trust complex backup systems. I have used "rsync --link-dest" to reduce space.
With files SHA512SUMS and SHA512SUMS.sign in the current directory the verifying can be as simple as
gpg --auto-key-retrieve SHA512SUMS.sign
The key is retrieved from user's default keyring or keyservers. The usual keyserver pool (pool.sks-keyservers.net) has the Debian CD signing key. How we can trust that the key is the right one is another matter. It is signed by many Debian developers.
Right, if you're already in the WOT then there are better ways, but then you're probably familiar enough with GPG that you don't need any help. :-)
Most distributions have signed checksum files, but also post those checksums in a HTTPS location. I, and I suspect most people, just check against that and call it good. AFAIK Debian don't have that, and between using GPG or thinking "F* it, I'll take my chances", I suspect many would choose the latter. I was trying to give people who's security conscious but not paranoid^W^Wlazy an option.
My favourite change is the transition to GnuPG 2.1 as the default /usr/bin/gpg. Particularly the "trust on first use" (TOFU) trust model is a really good improvement.
I use Emacs' org-mode for pretty much all my work notes. It's very structured, long and includes spreadsheets.
But usually I don't use my laptop during work. Instead I print just day's notes (schedule etc.) to a single paper sheet and keep the note paper with me. I do corrections and maybe add notes with a pen. Then later at home I modify my org-mode files to match my note paper.
Usually in Linux the system is installed on an encrypted filesystem (cryptsetup, LUKS). Only kernel and so called initrd image (early boot stuff) is outside the encryption. The disk is opened at very early stage in boot when just about the kernel is loaded. Thus, the encryption is open whenever the operating system is running. Everything is of course still transparently encrypted on disk but the "lock" is open. One must shut down the computer to close the filesystem's encryption.
PGP (now GnuPG) is used more these days than in BBS (Fidonet) years, particularly in the open source community. Software releases and packages in GNU/Linux distributions are signed by the developers. All the time. It happens automatically without end-user noticing. Is this not one definition of "working well?" Lot's of people are passively using it without knowing.
But for messaging it's indeed very marginal. In open source projects' techical mailing lists and version control systems there is pretty much message or commit signing but that's a marginal group who does that.
I'd believe PGP is in wider use today than Fidonet is, but not much wider.
I have to laugh that Snapchat has apparently solved the identity exchange problem and PGP is still stuck with these ridiculously baroque implementations.
>I have to laugh that Snapchat has apparently solved the identity exchange problem and PGP is still stuck with these ridiculously baroque implementations.
Er, how? Admittedly I've only used it a few times, but the only thing that sticks out along those lines is the Snapcode system. How is that any different than scanning a QR code in OpenKeychain?
“we are happy to say that we will be shipping an additional small batch of the Jolla Tablet to early backers during early 2016, targeting to send invitations during January. The bad news here is that we are not able to complete the production to fulfill all contributions. In other words, all of our backers will not get a Jolla Tablet.”
